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We model happiness as a measurement tool used to rank alternative
actions. Evolution favors a happiness function that measures the in-
dividual’s success in relative terms. The optimal function is based on
a time-varying reference point—or performance benchmark—that is
updated over time in a statistically optimal way in order to match the
individual’s potential. Habits and peer comparisons arise as special
cases of such an updating process. This updating also results in a
volatile level of happiness that continuously reverts to its long-term
mean. Throughout, we draw a parallel with a problem of optimal
incentives, which allows us to apply statistical insights from agency
theory to the study of happiness.
I. Introduction
For a long time, utility was assumed to depend only on the absolute
level of an individual’s economic conditions. However, a large body of
research now shows that the relative level of these conditions also plays
a central role: an individual’s utility, whether deﬁned in terms of de-
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cision making or hedonic experience, tends to be sharply inﬂuenced
by his personal history and social environment. Examples include Mar-
kowitz (1952), Stigler and Becker (1977), Frank (1985), Constantinides
(1990), Easterlin (1995), Clark and Oswald (1996), and Frederick and
Loewenstein (1999).
In the present paper, we study hedonic utility and how it motivates
choice. As a matter of terminology, we equate hedonic utility with “hap-
piness.” We are interested, speciﬁcally, in the following patterns.
1 First,
the hedonic impact of sustained changes in economic conditions has a
tendency to diminish over time, such as becoming accustomed to an
expensive lifestyle (i.e., habit formation). Second, the level of happiness
that an individual derives from his economic success is usually affected
by the success of his peers (i.e., peer comparisons). Third, happiness
is inﬂuenced by the individual’s prior expectations concerning his own
success. And fourth, while happiness is volatile, it tends to revert over
time to a relatively stable long-term mean. Taken together, these features
mean that the individual is mainly concerned not with his absolute level
of success, but rather with the difference between his success and a
benchmark that changes over time. Moreover, since these features cross
cultural boundaries and age groups, it is reasonable to assume that, at
a general level, they are innate.
In this paper, using economic tools, we argue that the above features
can be evolutionarily advantageous in the sense of improving the in-
dividual’s ability to propagate his genes. Our goal, in other words, is to
provide a biological foundation for these traits.
We view happiness as a decision-making device that allows the indi-
vidual to rank alternative courses of action (Damasio [1994] presents
neurological evidence consistent with this approach). In particular, we
study an abstract choice setting in which, in every period of his life, an
individual compares alternative input choices x toward the production
of a random output y. Consider, for example, a hunter-gatherer search-
ing for fruit: x describes his foraging strategy and y his level of success.
A higher y increases the individual’s prospects for survival and repro-
duction and therefore his ability to propagate his genes. We refer to
the expected value of y as the individual’s ﬁtness.
Associated with each level of y, the individual experiences a real-valued
happiness level V, and he measures the desirability of alternative choices
x by means of the expected value of happiness conditional on his choice:
. Throughout, we assume that the happiness function V is innate. E[VFx]
In addition, we assume that the individual’s measurement is E[VFx]
subject to a set of physical constraints that limit its precision. These
constraints are described below.
1 See Kahneman, Diener, and Schwarz (1999) for a review of the underlying psychology.304 journal of political economy
Our plan is to show that, given our set of physical constraints, a
happiness function V that is based on the individual’s relative success—
and exhibits the traits previously described—can lead to a more accurate
ranking of choices and, therefore, better decisions from a ﬁtness
perspective.
A. Evolutionary Approach
Our model is based on the following stylized evolutionary approach.
We begin with a class of environments that are presumably represen-
tative of the ancestral world in which we evolved. For these environ-
ments, we ﬁnd the happiness functions that maximize the individual’s
expected level of success (i.e., his ﬁtness) subject to our set of physical
constraints. Finally, we show that these ﬁtness-maximizing functions ex-
hibit the desired traits. The idea behind this approach is to characterize
the theoretical end point of a natural selection process in which, via
trial and error, the ﬁtness-maximizing happiness functions have come
to replace all the rest. This stylized approach is also employed in dif-
ferent contexts by Binmore (1994), Robson (2001b), Samuelson (2004),
and Samuelson and Swinkels (2006).
The theoretical problem of ﬁnding the ﬁtness-maximizing happiness
functions can be conveniently stated as a metaphorical principal-agent
problem. As is customary in the literature, the principal represents the
process of natural selection, and the agent represents an individual
carrying a set of genes. In the present context, the principal designs
the innate happiness function of the agent, with the goal of maximizing
the propagation of the agent’s genes. Importantly, the happiness func-
tion is only a means to this end: the principal does not directly care
about the agent’s happiness level. The agent, on the other hand, is born
with the happiness function designed by the principal and, via his ac-
tions, seeks only to maximize his level of happiness. In the process,
however, he inadvertently serves the principal’s goal.
Crucially, this theoretical exercise refers to the ancestral environment
in which humans evolved, not the modern world. In particular, when
talking about ﬁtness-maximizing happiness functions, we refer to func-
tions that optimized genetic multiplication during hunter-gatherer times
(before agriculture and animal domestication were developed). In mod-
ern times, on the other hand, we presumably share most of the innate
characteristics of our hunter-gatherer ancestors. But since the techno-
logical landscape has changed so rapidly since the rise of agriculture,
our happiness functions need no longer optimally promote the present
multiplication of our genes.evolutionary efﬁciency and happiness 305
B. Assumptions and Results
The key assumptions behind our results are two physical constraints that
restrict the agent’s precision when ranking alternative choices. The ﬁrst
constraint is a limit on the agent’s perception sensitivity. We assume
that two alternative choices and cannot be ranked by the agent xx 12
whenever the difference between his expected happiness levels
and is smaller than some minimum threshold. The E[VFx ] E[VFx ] 12
second constraint is a bound on the range of values that V can take. In
Section III, we provide a physiological motivation for these constraints
based on the function of nerve cells, and we also discuss laboratory
experiments on rats that are supportive of these assumptions.
As explained below, because of these imperfections, the agent will be
capable of a more accurate ranking across choices when he measures
the ﬁtness associated with each choice relative to the ﬁtness of alternative
options, as opposed to measuring ﬁtness in absolute terms. This is the
starting point for all our results.
A close analogy can be drawn with a speciﬁc feature of human vision.
The nerve cells in our eyes gauge the color and luminosity of an item
relative to its direct surroundings, not in absolute terms. In particular,
a typical light-processing cell has a center and a periphery, and its level
of activation is proportional to the difference in the amount of light
received across these two regions. Accordingly, the information it sends
to the brain is mainly about contrast.
2 This property enhances the brain’s
ability to identify difﬁcult items. Analogously, a happiness function that
measures the merit of alternative choices directly in terms of their dif-
ferences enhances the agent’s capacity to single out the most efﬁcient
among them.
In previous work, Frederick and Loewenstein (1999) and Robson
(2001a) present related arguments. Frederick and Loewenstein com-
pare a happiness function that changes over time with an eye that,
independently of the property described above, is capable of adjusting
to the general luminosity of the environment (e.g., through changes in
its pupil). Likewise, Robson compares happiness with a man-made mea-
surement instrument, such as a voltmeter, that can be calibrated to ﬁt
the problem at hand. Both forms of adaptation rescale the incoming
information so that it better matches the instrument’s effective range
of activation, therefore allowing for a more accurate discrimination
across stimuli. At a general level, this notion is also present in our
approach.
2 A noticeable consequence is the fact that the color and luminosity of a particular item
are perceived very differently depending on the color and luminosity of its direct sur-
roundings. For a detailed exposition and examples,see Kandel,Schwartz,andJessell(2000,
519).306 journal of political economy
Throughout our analysis, we draw a parallel between the evolutionary
problem and a principal-agent problem of optimal incentives under
moral hazard, where V corresponds to a performance payment for the
agent. In both cases, the principal who designs V seeks to maximize the
signal value of this function.
3 This parallel is central to our approach
since it allows us to apply statistical concepts from incentive theory to
the study of happiness. Moreover, thanks to these statistical concepts,
we can construct a uniﬁed theory for multiple aspects of happiness.
The optimal happiness functions we derive are based on a purely
relative measure of success. In any given period, the agent’s happiness
depends exclusively on the difference between his output y and an
endogenous reference point , which serves as a performance bench- ˆ y
mark (the difference is the carrier of happiness). This reference ˆ y   y
point is positioned according to the current opportunities faced by ˆ y
the agent and is updated over time in tandem with changes in these
opportunities. A by-product of this updating process is that, over time,
the agent’s happiness will tend to its mean.
We illustrate this dynamic process in an environment in which the
optimal reference point is updated every period to equal the conditional
expectation of output for that period. Whenever possible, this condi-
tional expectation will exploit information contained in past levels of
output, together with any additional information contained in the out-
put of peers. From here, we derive a rationale for habits and, simulta-
neously, for peer comparisons. Both these phenomena arise as special
cases of the same general process: a reference point that is updated
over time in a statistically meaningful way. On the basis of this notion,
we derive optimal reference points with speciﬁc functional forms.
Below, we derive two types of happiness functions. The ﬁrst type are
step functions that deliver the maximum level of happiness whenever
the agent exceeds his performance benchmark , and vice versa. These ˆ y
step functions are optimal under the two assumptions described above
on limited perception and bounded happiness. The second type, de-
rived in Appendix A, have a smoother S-shape. These functions arise
when a third assumption is added, namely, that the agent has an in-
formation advantage over the principal when selecting his actions. In
this case, the principal responds by spreading the slope of the happiness
function more evenly across the output domain.
We begin our analysis with a static model in which the agent lives for
3 In the standard agency problem, maximizing the signal value of V is the best way to
counteract the agent’s temptation to shirk. In the current evolutionary problem, on the
other hand, there is no equivalent temptation to shirk because the agent does not have
an exogenous effort cost. In this case, maximizing the signal value of V is the best way to
overcome the agent’s measurement limitations.evolutionary efﬁciency and happiness 307
one period. We then extend this model to a dynamic setting in which
his reference point changes over time.
II. Static Model
Consider a representative agent (i.e., a hunter-gatherer) who faces an
abstract one-shot project. To ﬁx ideas, suppose that this project amounts
to an opportunity to collect fruit. The agent ﬁrst observes the current
state of nature s, which describes the physical conﬁguration of the world,
such as the presence of fruit and dangers in speciﬁc locations. Next, he
selects a course of action , which represents the strategy adopted, x   X
such as traveling in a certain direction or climbing a particular tree.
The combination of x and s randomly determines a level of output
, namely, the amount of fruit collected.
4 Denote the conditional y    
probability distribution of output by , a function known by the f(yFx, s)
agent. Once y is realized, the agent experiences a one-dimensional level
of happiness given by (as discussed below, V will also potentially V(y)
depend on additional arguments). The agent is born with this happiness
function.
The origin of V is an evolutionary trial-and-error process, which we
call the principal. The metaphorical goal for the principal when creating
V is to promote the production of y, which is simply another way to say
that in a population of individuals endowed with a diversity of happiness
functions, those producing higher levels of y will have a reproductive
advantage. For concreteness, we assume that the principal seeks to max-
imize the expected value of y, which we call ﬁtness. (In our model, this
maximization leads to the same results as maximizing the expected value
of any other increasing function of y.)
Rather than studying the evolutionary trial-and-error dynamics, we
are interested in describing the limiting outcome once sufﬁcient ex-
perimentation and selection have taken place, while holding the envi-
ronment ﬁxed. We represent this limiting outcome by means of an
optimization problem in which the principal directly selects a happiness
function that maximizes her objective. (In general, an evolutionary pro-
cess in which genetic traits are passed on to offspring with small random
variations might converge to a local maximum that is not globally op-
timal. However, for the technologies considered below, the global op-
timum will coincide with a local maximum that is unique.)
Throughout, we assume that V is a function of the agent’s output y
4 Beyond this example, output y is meant to summarize the achievement of proximate
evolutionary goals, namely, those tangible goals that favored the ultimate evolutionary
goal of genetic replication during the ancestral environment. Examples presumably in-
clude wealth, health, and sex, as well as the well-being of friends and kin. Accordingly,
the decision variable x represents the actions taken in pursuit of these goals.308 journal of political economy
rather than his choice of input x. This means that the principal effec-
tively delegates the choice of x to the agent, who has the advantage of
knowing the current environmental details s. Binmore (1994, 151) and
Robson (2001b) follow a similar approach. On the other hand, notice
that could also potentially adjust to the state s. After analyzing our V(y)
basic model, we consider this case.
The agent measures the desirability of alternative choices x, given the
current state s, via his calculation of the expected value of happiness:
. This calculation leads to a state-contingent E[VFx, s] p V(y)f(yFx, s)dy  
utility function , built by the agent himself, which u(x, s) { E[VFx, s]
delivers a decision criterion. In what follows, we assume that the agent
can freely dispose of y. This allows us to focus without loss on nonde-
creasing happiness functions.
III. Measurement Imperfections
In the absence of any further constraints, the evolutionary problem has
a simple solution: the principal can select the identity function
. Under this function, the principal and agent’s objectives be- V(y) p y
come perfectly aligned since they both seek to maximize the expected
value of y. However, once our measurement constraints are introduced,
this function will no longer be optimal.
A. Limited Perception
Our ﬁrst constraint imposes a limit on the agent’s ability to perceive
small differences in his objective . Given any pair of choices E[VFx, s]
and , we assume that there exists a minimum threshold such xx e 1 0 12
that whenever the difference between and is smaller E[VFx , s] E[VFx , s] 12
than or equal to e, the agent fails to perceive a difference between these
two choices. Below, we treat e as exogenous, but our results hold for all
small values of e. Formally, we describe this imperfection by means of
a satisﬁcing set.
Deﬁnition 1. For any given happiness function V, perception
threshold , and state s, the agent’s satisﬁcing set is the set e 1 0 S(V, e, s)
of all actions x that deliver an expected happiness that is within E[VFx, s]
e distance of the optimized value , namely,
  max E[VFx , s]   x
  S(V, e, s) { x   X : maxE[VFx , s]   E[VFx, s]   e . {}   x
Condition 1 (Limited perception). We assume that the agent ran-
domly draws his choice from S(V, e, s). Moreover, this draw has fullevolutionary efﬁciency and happiness 309
support and is monotonic in the sense that, given e and s, the probability
assigned to any subset of S is inversely proportional to the size of S.
This condition imposes a coarseness in the agent’s perception anal-
ogous to the coarseness present in any of our ﬁve senses. Our senses,
like any other type of signaling activity in our nervous system, are based
on the stimulation and ﬁring of individual nerve cells. These nerve cells,
however, do not have inﬁnite sensitivity to differences in stimulation,
and their ﬁring rates are also subject to errors (see, e.g., Kandel et al.
2000, chap. 21). The overall result is that when two stimulus levels are
sufﬁciently similar, the individual fails to tell them apart.
5
As a preliminary exercise, it is useful to revisit the principal’s problem
when this ﬁrst constraint alone is present. In particular, suppose that
the principal uses a rescaled happiness function , for some V(y) p Ay
constant . In this case, for any given state s, the agent’s satisﬁcing A 1 0
set is given by
  S(Ay, e, s) { x   X : maxE[AyFx , s]   E[AyFx, s]   e , {}   x
where the happiness function V has been replaced by Ay. Given the
linearity of the expectation operators, this set is equal to
ee   S y,, s { x   X : maxE[yFx , s]   E[yFx, s]   . () {}   AA x
From here we learn that all the agent’s potential choices (those within
his satisﬁcing set) lead to an expected value of output within distance e/ A
of the highest achievable level . Moreover, a larger con-
  max E[yFx , s]   x
stant A is equivalent to a smaller perception threshold e. This means
that the principal can virtually eliminate all choice errors by selecting
an arbitrarily large constant A. Therefore, in and of itself, the limited
perception constraint favors a happiness function that is arbitrarily
steep.
5 Experiments with rats are also consistent with this type of limited sensitivity. For ex-
ample, Gallistel et al. (1991) and Simmons and Gallistel (1994) offer individual rats a
choice between two alternative levers that, when pressed, deliver electrical pulses to the
pleasure center of their brains. By activating the associated nerve cells, these electrical
pulses create a highly desirable effect (indeed, when offered the levers, rats will abandon
all other activities). The trade-off faced by the rats is that only one lever can be pressed
at a time (before the experiment begins, they sample both levers). Across trials, the
researcher can reliably induce a given rat to spend more time pressing a speciﬁc lever by
increasing the amount of electricity delivered by this lever while holding the alternative
constant, provided that this increase is sufﬁciently large. Small increases, however, lead to
essentially random responses.310 journal of political economy
B. Bounded Happiness
Our second constraint is a limit on the range of values that happiness
V can take. We assume, in particular, that V must fall within a bounded
range , for some ﬁnite limits and . Below, we treat [V , V ] VV min max min max
and as exogenous, but our results are identical for any such VV min max
limits.
Condition 2 (Bounded happiness). For all y,. V(y)   [V , V ] min max
We view these bounds as a physical limit on our nervous system. As
explained by Kandel et al. (2000, 21–32), the fundamental signals in
our nervous system are electrical pulses called action potentials, which
are ﬁred by individual nerve cells. (A speciﬁc hedonic state, e.g., would
result from a particular ﬁring pattern among a group of cells.) Each
one of these electrical pulses is binary (i.e., all or nothing), and they
always have the same magnitude. This means that the information trans-
mitted by a given cell is based on the frequency of these pulses, not
their individual magnitudes. In addition, owing to a chemical recovery
process (called the refractory period), there is a maximum rate at which
these pulses can be ﬁred. This limit imposes a physical bound on the
potential activity of each cell and therefore a bound on any system
composed of a ﬁnite number of cells.
6
Once again, as a preliminary exercise, it is useful to revisit the prin-
cipal’s problem when only this second constraint is present. For con-
creteness, consider the case in which output y is distributed over a
bounded domain of arbitrary size. In addition, consider a [y , y ] min max
linear happiness function , with . Since output is V(y) p Ay   BA 1 0
bounded, regardless of the happiness bounds, there always exist levels
of A and B such that is contained within . Moreover, V(y)[ V , V ] min max
given that the agent makes no mistakes, he will always choose an action
that fully maximizes his expected happiness . But since A E[Ay   BFx, s]
is positive, this is equivalent to maximizing the expected value of y. Thus
the principal and agent’s objectives are again fully aligned.
7
From the above exercises, we learn that neither one of the two con-
straints, taken on its own, constitutes a meaningful restriction for the
6 The rat experiments described in the previous footnote also provide support for the
bounded happiness assumption (see esp. Simmons and Gallistel 1994). The electrical
pulses delivered to the pleasure center of the rat’s brain cause its nerve cells to ﬁre action
potentials in direct proportion to the amount of electricity received. These action poten-
tials are responsible for the desirable experience (nerve cells function in the same fun-
damental way in rats as in humans). But once the researcher increases the amount of
electricity beyond a given level—by increasing current (which increases the number of
active neurons) and pulse frequency (which increases the ﬁring rate of each active neu-
ron)—the rat’s pleasure center becomes saturated with action potentials, and beyond this
level, the rat no longer responds to further increases in electricity.
7 On the other hand, when the domain of y is unbounded, this result can still be
approximated to an arbitrary degree by means of an arbitrarily small A.evolutionary efﬁciency and happiness 311
principal. In either case, she can induce arbitrarily efﬁcient decisions
by merely rescaling the identity function . Notice, moreover, V(y) p y
that these rescaled functions are still based on the absolute level of
output.
The principal’s problem becomes very different, however, when the
two constraints are combined. In particular, recall that the limited per-
ception constraint favors an arbitrarily steep happiness function (with
an arbitrarily large A), but such a function would exceed the bounds
imposed by the second constraint regardless of the size of these bounds.
As shown below, this trade-off will lead to happiness functions that are
steep only where it matters the most. These functions, in particular, will
concentrate their slope over a performance benchmark, or reference
point, that targets the agent’s output potential. Moreover, the use of
this benchmark means that output will effectively be measured in relative
terms. We derive speciﬁc shapes for these functions below: they will be
either step functions (in the main text) or S-shaped curves (in App.
A).
In general, the principal would beneﬁt from both a larger happiness
range and a smaller perception threshold e. This means that [V , V ] min max
the natural selection process would presumably operate over these di-
mensions as well. However, as mentioned above, our results are not
affected by the speciﬁc values of and e, provided that the [V , V ] min max
range remains ﬁnite and e remains small but strictly positive. [V , V ] min max
IV. Output Technologies
In order to obtain explicit solutions for the principal’s problem, we
consider output technologies of the form
y p E[yFx, s]   z, (1)
where z is a zero-mean exogenous shock that is realized afterx is selected.
We assume that this shock z is drawn from a continuous density func-
tion with full support in that is single-peaked and strictly monotonic  
on either side of its mean (such as a normal).
8 We also assume that (a)
is continuous in x;( b) the choice space X is a compact and E[yFx, s]
convex subset of ; and (c) for all states s,
N     max E[yFx , s] 1   x
, so that the agent’s choice problem is nontrivial.
  min E[yFx , s]   x
Let denote the conditional probability distributions for y f(yFx, s)
associated with these technologies. For any given state s, these distri-
butions have the following properties. First, they are single-peaked at
8 Our results do not depend on the fact that the output domain is unbounded. This
assumption is made merely for expositional convenience. In particular, given the agent’s
limited perception, the happiness bounds would bind regardless of the size of the output
domain.312 journal of political economy
their mean . Second, they are single-crossing in x: for all and E[yFx, s] x1
such that , the distributions and xE [yFx , s] ( E[yFx , s] f(yFx , s) 2 1 2 1
intersect for only one value of y (between their two means). f(yFx , s) 2
And third, they are ordered across x according to ﬁrst-order stochastic
dominance. These are the key distributional properties we employ.
V. An Efﬁciency Index
It is useful to summarize the quality of the agent’s decision x using a
one-dimensional index J, which we call the efﬁciency of his decision. We
deﬁne this efﬁciency index as follows:
  E[yFx, s]  min E[yFx , s]   x J(x, s) { .    max E[yFx , s]  min E[yFx , s]    xx
Notice that is affected by the agent’s choice x only through the J(x, s)
ﬁrst term in the numerator: . In particular, for any given state E[yFx, s]
s, this term ranges from to , depending on
   min E[yFx , s] max E[yFx , s]    xx
the quality of the agent’s decision. Accordingly, for any given s, the
efﬁciency index J ranges from zero to one.
From the deﬁnition of J, expected output becomes
   E[yFx, s] p J 7maxE[yFx , s]   (1   J) 7minE[yFx , s], (2)
   xx
where the arguments of J have been omitted for clarity. From this
expression, we learn that the agent’s choice xaffects output only through
J.
A one-dimensional choice problem.—In what follows, for analytical pur-
poses, we view the agent as directly choosing an efﬁciency level J from
the interval [0, 1], as opposed to choosing a multidimensional action
x from . This step is valid because the choice of x affects output only
N  
through its impact on J. As a result, we can directly focus on J while
sending x to the background.
Expressed as a function of J, the output technology in (1) becomes
y p E[yFJ, s]   z, (3)
where the expectation corresponds to the right-hand side of E[yFJ, s]
(2):
   E[yFJ, s] p J 7maxE[yFx , s]   (1   J) 7minE[yFx , s]. (4)
   xx
For all states s, this expectation is continuous and increasing in J. This
means that higher values of J are strictly preferred by the principal.
Notice that the state s can potentially play two different roles. First,
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of the agent’s decision J. This occurs through its impact over the terms
and . Through these terms, s inﬂuences
   max E[yFx , s] min E[yFx , s]    xx
the agent’s overall output potential. For example, s can capture the
season of the year in which the hunter-gatherer searches for fruit, with
a more favorable season leading to a higher value for .
  max E[yFx , s]   x
Second, since J is originally a function of both x and the state s, the
latter can inﬂuence what the optimal choice of x happens to be. For
example, in addition to representing the season of the year, s can in-
dicate which particular trees are likely to have fruit. However, once the
choice problem is expressed in terms of J, this second role is sent to
the background.
VI. Optimal Happiness Functions
We begin our analysis with the simplest case in which, conditional on
J, the expectation is independent of s. Formally, the terms E[yFJ, s]
and in equation (4) are independent of
   max E[yFx , s] min E[yFx , s]    xx
s. (In Sec. VII below, we consider the more general case.) Output now
simpliﬁes to
y p E[yFJ]   z. (5)
The associated densities have the following properties (inherited f(yFJ)
from the original densities ): they are single-peaked at their mean f(yFx, s)
, single-crossing in J, and increasing in J in the ﬁrst-order sto- E[yFJ]
chastic sense.
A. The Agent’s Satisﬁcing Set
In terms of his efﬁciency choice , the agent’s satisﬁcing set is J   [0, 1]
given by
  ˜ S(V, e) { J   [0, 1] : maxE[VFJ ]   E[VFJ]   e . (6) {}   J
As before, when selecting J, the agent will come only within e distance
of maximizing his expected happiness. Remark 1 helps us characterize
this satisﬁcing set.
Remark 1. Under the technologies in (5), for any nondecreasing
happiness function V, the expected value of happiness is non- E[VFJ]
decreasing in J and therefore is maximized when . J p 1
Proof. Recall that for any pair of decisions , the conditional J 1 J 12
distribution dominates in the ﬁrst-order stochastic sense. f(yFJ ) f(yFJ ) 12
As a result, the expected value of any nondecreasing function is V(y)
weakly higher under J1 than under J2. QED314 journal of political economy
From this remark, it follows that the agent’s satisﬁcing set is an
interval.
Lemma 1. Under the technologies in (5), for any nondecreasing
happiness function V, the agent’s satisﬁcing set is given by the ˜ S(V, e)
interval , where the lower limit is given by the [J (V, e), 1] J (V, e) min min
smallest value of (possibly zero) such that J   [0, 1] E[VFJ]  
. E[VF1]   e
Proof. From remark 1, we know that . From
  max E[VFJ ] p E[VF1]   J
this fact and the deﬁnition of in (6), it follows that a choice ˜ S(V, e)
belongs to the satisﬁcing set if and only if J   [0, 1]
E[VFJ]   E[VF1]   e.
Since is nondecreasing in J (again from remark 1), this inequality E[VFJ]
implies that the satisﬁcing set is an interval with an upper limit equal
to one. Moreover, the lower limit of the satisﬁcing set corresponds to
the smallest value of satisfying this inequality, as stated in the J   [0, 1]
lemma. QED
B. The Agent’s Choice
According to condition 1 (limited perception), the agent will randomly
draw his choice J from the interval . Let denote [J (V, e), 1] E[JF V, e] min
the expected value of this choice.
Remark 2. Under condition 1 and the technologies in (5), the
expectation is increasing in . In other words, the ex- E[JF V, e] J (V, e) min
pected efﬁciency of the agent’s choice increases when his satisﬁcing set
shrinks.
Proof. Condition 1 implies that the agent’s random draw of J is
monotonic: the smaller his satisﬁcing set , the larger the [J (V, e), 1] min
probability assigned to any subset of this interval. As a result, the ex-
pected value of J must increase as shrinks. QED [J (V, e), 1] min
C. The Principal’s Problem
The principal’s objective is to maximize the expected output E[yFJ]
considering that the agent’s efﬁciency choice J is randomly drawn from
. But since is linear in J (from eq. [4]), maximizing [J (V, e), 1] E[yFJ] min
is equivalent to maximizing the expected efﬁciency level chosen E[yFJ]
by the agent, . Accordingly, the principal’s problem becomes E[JF V, e]
maxE[JF V, e]
V
subject to V(y)   [V , V ] for all y. min maxevolutionary efﬁciency and happiness 315
Moreover, from remark 2, maximizing is equivalent to max- E[JF V, e]
imizing the lower limit of the agent’s satisﬁcing set . This ob- J (V, e) min
servation allows us to restate the principal’s problem more compactly:
maxJ (V, e) (P1) min
V
subject to V(y)   [V , V ] for all y. min max
Intuitively, this problem corresponds to excluding the maximum num-
ber of inefﬁcient choices from the agent’s satisﬁcing set. J ! 1
Deﬁnition 2. Let J* denote the optimized value for problem (P1).
For any positive e, this value J* is less than one. In addition, provided
that e is small, J* is larger than zero (i.e., at least some inefﬁcient choices
can be excluded from the satisﬁcing set). This is the case we focus on.
The following lemma allows us to solve for the optimal V using a dual
approach.
Lemma 2. Suppose that is a solution to problem (P1), namely, V*
. In addition, suppose that . Then must also J (V*, e) p J* J* 1 0 V* min
solve
maxE[VF1]   E[VFJ*] (P2)
V
subject to V(y)   [V , V ] for all y. min max
Proof. Suppose not. Then there must exist a (satisfying the V ( V*
constraint) such that . Moreover, E[VF1]   E[VFJ*] 1 E[V*F1]   E[V*FJ*]
given that , we must have (since this J* 1 0 E[V*F1]   E[V*FJ*] p e
equality deﬁnes the lower bound of the agent’s satisﬁcing set). When
these expressions are combined, it follows that . But E[VF1]   E[VFJ*] 1 e
this implies that , a contradiction to the fact that solves J (V, e) 1 J* V* min
problem (P1). QED
This lemma is central to our analysis. It tells us that any optimal
specializes in maximizing the difference in expected happiness be- V*
tween choosing the ideal and choosing the less efﬁcient . J p 1 J* ! 1
By maximizing this difference, the principal prevents the agent from
choosing an even less efﬁcient level . All other inefﬁcient choices J ! J*
, by deﬁnition, can never be excluded from the agent’s satis- J   [J*, 1)
ﬁcing set.
Using this lemma, we can characterize the optimal V.
Proposition 1. The principal’s problem (P1) is solved by a step
happiness function such that V*
ˆ V for all y   y max V*(y) p { ˆ V for all y ! y, min
where the threshold is uniquely determined by the equality ˆ y316 journal of political economy
. Moreover, this solution is unique up to a subset of ˆˆ f(yF1) p f(yFJ*)
measure zero.
Proof. The objective in the dual problem (P2) from lemma 2 is
equal to
V(y)[ f(yF1)   f(yFJ*)]dy.  
This integral is maximized by setting for every y such that V(y) p Vmax
and for every y such that . f(yF1)   f(yFJ*) V(y) p Vf (yF1) ! f(yFJ*) min
Moreover, from the single-crossing of f, we have for all f(yF1) 1 f(yFJ*)
and for all . Finally, since al- ˆˆ y 1 yf (yF1) ! f(yFJ*) y ! yf (yF1) ( f(yFJ*)
most everywhere, this solution is unique up to a measure zero subset
and therefore solves problem (P1) as well. QED
This result can be derived graphically. Figure 1a plots two conditional
densities . The bold curve represents , the most desirable f(yFJ) f(yF1)
density for the principal, and the dashed curve represents . Recall f(yFJ*)
that the dual objective in lemma 2 is to maximize the difference in
expected happiness between these two alternatives. As depicted in ﬁgure
1b, this is achieved by delivering the maximum possible happiness
for all values of y that are more likely to arise under than V J p 1 max
under (i.e., all values such that ), and vice versa. J p J* f(yF1) 1 f(yFJ*)
As a result, we obtain a step function with a threshold that lies where ˆ y
the two densities intersect, namely, between their two peaks and E[yFJ*]
. E[yF1]
Intuitively, recall that the limited perception condition favors an ar-
bitrarily steep happiness function that minimizes the agent’s mistakes.
However, because of the happiness bounds, this function cannot be
steep over the entire domain. In order to cope with this trade-off, the
principal chooses a function that is inﬁnitely steep only at a critical
point (the reference point), while keeping to the bounds at all other
points.
9
A key property of this function is that it depends exclusively on
relative output . Thanks to this feature, specializes in com- ˆ y   yV *
municating the merit of alternative choices J relative to each other,
with no reference to the absolute level of ﬁtness associated with E[yFJ]
each one.
D. Optimal Incentives
A statistical parallel can be drawn between the principal’s dual problem
(P2)—leading to the step function above—and a problem of optimal
9 In Sec. VII and App. A, we discuss the case of smoother S-shaped curves.evolutionary efﬁciency and happiness 317
Fig. 1.—The optimal V
incentives (e.g., Holmstrom 1979; Levin 2003). In particular, we can
interpret V as a performance bonus, J as an effort variable, and the
bounds for V as a two-sided limited-liability constraint. Under this in-
terpretation, the one-step bonus above maximally punishes the agent
following a deviation to J*. Accordingly, we can view this bonus as
implicitly testing the null “ ” against the alternative “ ” on J p 1 J p J*
the basis of the realization of y. Under this test, the null is precisely
rejected when the likelihood ratio exceeds one, which f(yFJ*)/f(yF1)
constitutes an optimal statistical test. In this way, the principal maximizes
the signal value of V. This statistical theme will be present throughout.318 journal of political economy
E. The Limit When e r 0
For expositional purposes, it is convenient to work with the limit as e
converges to zero. Even though we treat e as exogenous, the optimal
happiness functions that arise in this limit serve as an approximation
for the happiness functions that are optimal for small values of e.
Proposition 2. For any given , let denote the optimal e 1 0 V*(e)
happiness function characterized by proposition 1. As e converges to
zero, converges pointwise to the step function V*(e)
V for all y   E[yF1] max V(y) p {V for all y ! E[yF1]. min
Proof. See Appendix B.
The intuition behind this result is as follows. As , the agent’s e r 0
mistakes become arbitrarily small. Consequently, the optimized lower
bound for the satisﬁcing set J* converges to one, and therefore,
converges to . Graphically, this means that the lower E[yFJ*] E[yF1]
dashed density in ﬁgure 1a converges to the higher bold one. But this
implies that the happiness threshold , which lies between the two peaks ˆ y
of these densities, and , must converge to , as claimed E[yFJ*] E[yF1] E[yF1]
by the proposition.
Up to a measure zero subset, this limiting function uniquely maxi-
mizes the derivative
 
E[VFJ]F p V(y)f (yFJ) F dy, Jp1   JJ p1  J
which represents the limiting version of the objective in the dual prob-
lem (P2). Maximizing this derivative guarantees that marginal deviations
away from have a maximal impact over the agent’s objective, thus J p 1
improving his ability to discriminate. In terms of optimal incentives, this
problem corresponds to a ﬁrst-order approach in which all incentive
power is focused over small effort deviations (e.g., Rogerson 1985; Levin
2003). As before, the optimal happiness function communicates differ-
ences across choices, not their absolute ﬁtness levels.
VII. Extended Technologies
Here we return to the more general technologies in (3) in which ex-
pected output can depend directly on s. From equation (4), E[yFJ, s]
this means that the extreme values and
   max E[yFx , s] min E[yFx , s]    xx
vary with s.
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of a subset of s, denoted Q. This variable Q represents, for example,
current weather conditions. Accordingly, output becomes
y p E[yFJ, Q]   z, (7)
with associated densities . In addition, we assume that the prin- f(yFJ, Q)
cipal can use Q as an argument of the agent’s happiness function, so
that happiness becomes . V(y, Q)
In this case, since Q enters both the technology and the happiness
function, it effectively becomes a parameter that indexes all our former
results. In fact, save for this indexation, the optimal happiness functions
are identical to those derived in the previous section. Speciﬁcally, in
the limit for small e, the optimal function is given by
ˆ V for all y   y(Q) max V(y, Q) p { ˆ V for all y ! y(Q), min
where the threshold , now a function of Q, satisﬁes ˆ y(Q)
ˆ y(Q) p E[yFJ, Q]F . Jp1
As before, this threshold corresponds to the peak of the output density
conditional on the optimal choice . f(yFJ, Q) J p 1
The difference with the basic model is that the agent’s reference point
can now explicitly adapt to the environment. For instance, in a day with
good weather in which output is likely to be high (as measured by Q),
the agent’s reference point will automatically shift to the right. We derive
speciﬁc examples of this adaptation in the dynamic version of the model
in Sections VIII and IX.
S-shaped happiness functions.—Before we proceed, it is worth empha-
sizing that all the happiness functions derived so far have an extreme
step shape. These functions, in particular, can be interpreted as limiting
versions of S-shaped curves with a slope that is entirely concentrated
over the threshold . The reason for this shape is that the principal can ˆ y
ﬁne-tune the happiness functions using all information Q that is relevant
for output. This allows her to precisely target incentives where they
matter the most.
In order to obtain functions with a smoother, more realistic, S-shape,
we consider an extension of the model in Appendix A. In this extension,
output is affected by an additional state variable q, observed by the
agent before choosing his action, that is too detailed to be encoded in
V. As a result, the agent effectively has an information advantage over
the principal. In response, the principal designs S-shaped happiness
functions with slopes that are more evenly spread over the output do-
main. In this way, she provides incentives that are targeted more broadly.
These S-shaped functions share the same key feature with the step320 journal of political economy
functions considered so far: they both depend exclusively on the dif-
ference between output y and a performance benchmark that adapts ˆ y
over time in tandem with the agent’s output potential. This feature is
the main focus of our paper. In what follows, with the exception of
Appendix A, we focus on step functions in order to make the analysis
more transparent.
VIII. Dynamic Model
Here we extend the model to a dynamic setup in which the agent lives
for multiple periods . We equate every period with one t p 1, 2, …
separate project. At the beginning of period t, the agent observes a state
and selects an action . Output is then given by sx   X tt
y p E[yFx , s]   z , t t t t t
which satisﬁes the same properties as above, with independently and zt
identically distributed across time.
Once again, we can reformulate the agent’s choice problem so that,
every period, he chooses an efﬁciency level instead of a J   [0, 1] t
multidimensional action . In this case, output simpliﬁes to xt
y p E[yFJ, Q]   z , (8) t t t t t
where Qt represents the relevant subset of the state that affects output st
directly. After output is realized, the agent experiences a happiness level
, which we allow to depend on both and Qt. V   [V , V ] y t min max t
The agent’s objective for period t is to maximize the expected value
of , as opposed to some expected discounted value of future happiness Vt
levels. In other words, everything the agent cares about, present and
future, is already reﬂected in his present hedonic utility. This model
captures forward-looking behavior by interpreting a given project as
being forward-looking itself and motivated by current happiness. Con-
sider, for example, a hunter-gatherer who eats in excess of his current
needs in order to accumulate fat, or who helps a friend, precisely be-
cause it makes him happy today (a modern counterpart would be an
individual who invests in his retirement funds because it increases his
present happiness level).
10
Notice that every period of this dynamic model is identical to the
10 In subsection B below, we also brieﬂy discuss the case in which the agent cares about
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static model studied so far. It follows that, in the limit for small e, the
optimal happiness function for any given period t is given by
ˆ V for all y   y(Q) max tt V(y, Q) p t t t { ˆ V for all y ! y(Q), min tt
where the optimal threshold satisﬁes ˆ y(Q) t
ˆ y(Q) p E[yFJ, Q]F . (9) t t t t J p1 t
As before, these limiting functions serve as an approximation of the
happiness functions that are optimal for small values of e, all of which
have thresholds close to (9). In what follows, we denote more ˆ y(Q) t
compactly by . In addition, recall that in the limit when , the ˆ y e r 0 t
agent’s equilibrium action becomes . This action also serves as J p 1 t
an approximation for the actions selected for small e.
The dynamic properties of this model arise from the fact that will ˆ yt
be optimally updated over time in order to track changes in the un-
derlying state of technology Qt. This updating is governed by the con-
ditional expectation operator in (9), which means that the information
contained in Qt will be used in a statistically meaningful way. In what
follows, we use this fact to derive speciﬁc examples.
A. Habit Formation
We proceed with two simple examples in which incorporates a habit ˆ yt
due to an Qt that is correlated across time. Possible causes for this cor-
relation include shocks that determine the agent’s intrinsic ability and
shocks to the environment, both of which can potentially persist over
time.
Example 1: A Markovian habit. Suppose that output is given by
, where vt is a random shock that follows the Markovian pro- y p J   v t t t
cess . Equivalently, output can be expressed as v p v   zy p J   tt  1 t tt
. This technology satisﬁes equation (8) with , which is v   z Q p v t 1 t tt  1
correlated across time. Notice that can be inferred from the lagged vt 1
equality . As a result, output becomes y p J   v y p J   (y   t 1 t 1 t 1 t t t 1
. In equilibrium, once , this equation reduces to J )   z J p J p 1 t 1 t t t 1
, from which it follows that (the best predictor of ) y p y   z y y tt  1 tt  1 t
becomes the optimal reference point:
ˆ y p E[yFJ, Q]F p y . t t t t J p1 t 1 t
In this case, the agent will experience a high level of happiness if and
only if his current output exceeds what he achieved one period ago.322 journal of political economy
Analogous to an optimal incentive scheme, in order to best guide the
agent, the principal will employ her most accurate source of information
regarding Jt. From the equality , we learn that y   y p J   J   z tt  1 tt  1 t
the most accurate source is the difference . As a result, this y   y tt  1
difference becomes the carrier of happiness. In contrast, if the reference
point did not adapt, as vt drifts to extreme values, all decisions Jt would
appear increasingly good or increasingly bad, and thus increasingly
similar.
On the other hand, observe that a reduction in Jt will affect in yt
exactly the same way as a low realization of , implying that these two zt
variables cannot be distinguished by . As a consequence, the principal Vt
must punish the agent following low realizations of , and vice versa: zt
luck will inevitably affect happiness.
In fact, in equilibrium, the sole carrier of happiness becomes the
random shock (i.e., ). This implies that the expected value ˆ zy   y p z t t t t
of happiness is the same for every period, regardless of past levels of
output: the effects of luck are always short-lived. These features are
shared by all the examples that follow.
In many languages, the word “happiness” is closely linked to “fortune”
and “luck.” For the ancient Greeks, for example, happiness (eudaimonia)
was ultimately determined by the will of the gods: “When viewed through
mortal eyes, the world’s happenings—and so our happiness—could only
appear random, a function of chance” (McMahon 2004, 7).
Example 2: Autoregressive habits. Suppose that output is given by
, and vt follows the autoregressive process
  y p J   vv p  av   t t t t k t k kp1
for arbitrary constants ak. In this case, Qt is the vector . z (v , v , …) t t 1 t 2
Following steps similar to those in example 1, output becomes y p t
. In equilibrium, this equation reduces to
  J    a (y   J )   z t k t kt  kt kp1
, from which we obtain
   y p  a y   (1    a )   z t k t k k t kp1 kp1
  
ˆ y p E[yFJ, Q]F p a y   1   a .    () t t t t J p1 kt  kk t
kp1 kp1
The reference point is now a weighted average between past levels
of output and the equilibrium efﬁciency level . In this case, the J p 1 t
individual could potentially adapt more gradually over time, or even
adapt only to a partial extent (i.e., when the sum of the ak coefﬁcients
is smaller than one). The speciﬁc weights guarantee that the carrier of
happiness employs only the new information contained in . ˆ y   yy tt tevolutionary efﬁciency and happiness 323
B. Habits and Forward-Looking Behavior
In our model, the presence of habits does not deter the agent from
seeking . A possible interpretation is that the agent is simply un- J p 1 t
aware of these habits and therefore does not take them into account.
This interpretation is consistent with a common conclusion in the psy-
chology literature that the average individual sharply underestimates
the degree to which he will habituate to an improvement in his eco-
nomic conditions (see, e.g., Gilbert et al. 1998; Loewenstein and
Schkade 1999).
11
Nonetheless, the presence of habits still opens the possibility that an
agent who recognizes the existence of these habits, and manages to
internalize their effect, might beneﬁt from a deviation. Whether such
a proﬁtable deviation exists depends on how the reference point is ˆ yt
determined outside equilibrium. So far, this issue has not been dis-
cussed.
Consider the technologies of example 2. In general, there are several
alternative formulations for the reference point, all of which are equiv-
alent in equilibrium. For example, may correspond to an exogenous ˆ yt
function of past levels of output, namely,
  
ˆ y p a y   1   a .    () t k t kk
kp1 kp1
Alternatively, may equal the best predictor of conditional on ˆ yy J p t t t
and all past information, namely, 1
 
ˆ y p E[yFJ, Q]F p av   1   t t t t J p1 kt  k t
kp1
(where the values of are inferred from the technological equalities vt k
). In this case, the agent uses her best cognitive abilities v p y   J t kt  kt  k
to form an output expectation conditional on , only to then com- J p 1 t
pare her actual success against this self-imposed benchmark. When yt
for all k, both formulations coincide. The difference arises J p 1 t k
outside equilibrium.
In the former case, a reduction in Jt will reduce future reference
points by reducing , thus increasing the expected value of future hap- yt
piness. As a result, the deviation might indeed be beneﬁcial.
12 In the
latter case, in contrast, the agent understands that a reduction in Jt will
not affect his future reference points because they depend only on the
11 See also Burnham and Phelan (2001) and Frey and Stutzer (2004) for a discussion
of biased predictions.
12 For example, if the agent maximizes a geometrically discounted sum of future hap-
piness levels at rate b, a marginal deviation away from will be beneﬁcial if and only J p 1 t
if .
  k   ba 1 1 k kp1324 journal of political economy
underlying technological shocks vt, and not on the particular realization
of . This case describes an agent who cannot change his future output yt
expectations by merely reducing Jt. Therefore, a deviation is never ben-
eﬁcial. In this case, maximizing a present discounted sum is
  t   b Vt t tp0
identical to maximizing current happiness alone. Vt
IX. Multiple Agents
In order to derive peer effects, we extend the model to include multiple
agents i. During each period t, the agents simultaneously select efﬁciency
levels . These choices randomly determine an output level for each
i i J y t t
agent. Let denote the average output across agents, and let
i ¯ yw { t t
denote relative output. Our new assumption is that agents will
i ¯ y   y tt
experience common productivity shocks (e.g., because of a shared en-
vironment). This implies that peer output will be valuable when assessing
individual performance.
13 Dropping the i superscript, we focus on tech-
nologies such that
w p E[wFJ, Q]   z . (10) t t t t t
Throughout, we assume that these technologies satisfy our previous
assumptions with in the place of . In addition, we assume that is w y z t t t
independent across agents and that the population average for these
shocks is zero (i.e., an exact law of large numbers applies). Finally, we
allow V to depend on as well as on Qt. ¯ yt
From (10), notice that the output density depends on ¯ f(yFJ, y, Q) t t t t
and only through the agent’s relative position . As a result, hap- ¯ y y w tt t
piness can be expressed without loss as . It follows that this V(w, Q) t t t
model is identical to the model with a single agent, with replacing wt
. yt
Consequently, in the limit for small e, the optimal is a step function Vt
with for all , and for all , ˆˆ V(w, Q) p Vw   wV (w, Q) p Vw ! w t t t max t t t t t min tt
where the new benchmark is given by
ˆ w p E[wFJ, Q]F . t t t t J p1 t
Example 3: Static peer comparisons. Suppose that output for each
agent is given by . The term Gt represents an aggregate y p J   G   z t t t t
shock that is shared by all agents, whereas is the idiosyncratic shock zt
from (10). Both Gt and are realized after Jt is selected. No restrictions zt
13 If the principal directly beneﬁtted from relative output , peer effects would im- wt
mediately arise (see, e.g., Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite [1992] for the potential beneﬁts
conveyed by ). Here we show how these effects can extend beyond any direct advantage wt
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over the distribution of Gt are imposed. In equilibrium, by averaging
across agents we obtain . Therefore, ¯¯ y p 1   G y   y p w p (J   t t t t t t
, which satisﬁes (10) (in this case, Qt is redundant). The optimal 1)   zt
reference point for becomes . Accordingly, the ˆ ww p E[wFJ]F p 0 t t t t J p1 t
reference point for is given by . ˆ ¯ yy p y t t t
The carrier of happiness now becomes the agent’s relative success
. The reason why enters the happiness function is that it ﬁlters ¯¯ y   yy t t t
out the aggregate shock Gt, and therefore it increases the statistical
power of the measurement device. The resulting happiness function is
analogous to a relative performance scheme inside a ﬁrm. By tightening
the connection between effort and reward, the effect of this scheme is
to magnify the cost of withdrawing effort (e.g., Lazear and Rosen 1981;
Green and Stokey 1983).
In related work, Samuelson (2004) proposes an additional biological
role for peer inﬂuences. His work differs from the present approach in
terms of both the particular phenomenon under investigation and the
mechanism leading to the results. Samuelson is interested in peer im-
itation (e.g., why we follow the crowd in our consumption decisions),
as opposed to the hedonic effects of relative success (e.g., why we derive
more happiness from the size of our ofﬁce, our salary, or our health,
when it compares favorably to that of our peers). In particular, he argues
that by introducing peer consumption in the agent’s utility function,
evolution can bias the agent toward imitating his peers as opposed to
making an independent decision. In this way, the agent relies less on
his own imperfect cognitive skills.
Habits and peers.—A distinctive implication of our model arises when
habits and peer comparisons are combined. We begin with a simple
example that joins examples 1 and 3.
Example 4: A Markovian habit and dynamic peer comparisons.
Suppose that output for each agent is given by , where y p J   G   v t t t t
Gt is an arbitrary aggregate shock, and vt is an idiosyncratic shock that
follows the Markovian process . The difference from ex- v p v   z tt  1 t
ample 1 is the presence of Gt, and the difference from example 3 is the
persistence of the idiosyncratic shock. Using this technology, we can
write . Moreover, in equilibrium, y   y p (J   J )   (G   G )   z tt  1 tt  1 tt  1 t
. Combining these expressions, we obtain ¯¯ y   y p G   G w p (J   tt  1 tt  1 tt
, which satisﬁes (10) once (with J )   w   z J p 1 Q p w p t 1 t 1 tt  1 tt  1
). As a result, the reference point in terms of becomes ¯ v   v w t 1 t 1 t
. Accordingly, the reference point in terms of becomes ˆ w p wy tt  1 t
ˆ ¯¯ y p y   y   y . tt  1 tt  1326 journal of political economy
This reference point is not the mere sum of and , which would ¯ yy t 1 t
imply that the carrier of happiness is the difference between the ˆ y   y tt
increase in output and the average peer output . This ¯ Dy p y   yy t t t 1 t
difference would lead to a comparison between an innovation and an
absolute level, which is hard to justify on statistical grounds. Rather, the
carrier of happiness becomes a double difference:
ˆ ¯ y   y p Dy   Dy. t t t t
In this case, while and reduce current happiness, has the ¯¯ y y y t 1 tt  1
opposite effect. We interpret this effect as a generalized process of ha-
bituation that extends to the output of peers. Consider, for example, a
sudden and permanent increase in , with held constant. This increase ¯ yy tt
will initially shift the reference point to the right, with a likely decrease
in happiness. But after one period, will enter the reference point with ¯ yt
a negative sign, shifting it back to its original level. As a result, the agent
will have successfully coped.
Equivalently, the carrier of happiness can be expressed as the change
in the agent’s relative position:
ˆ y   y p w   w . t t t t 1
This expression again represents a double difference: the agent com-
pares his current output with the output of his peers in order to ¯ yy tt
obtain his relative social position . And, on top of this, he compares wt
with the social position he occupied one period ago. This leads ww tt  1
to a twice-relative happiness function: an advance in social position
increases happiness, and vice versa, but this effect is only short-lived.
We conclude with a result that encompasses all the examples above.
Proposition 3. Suppose that output for each agent is given by
, where Gt is an arbitrary aggregate shock, and vt follows y p J   G   v t t t t
the autoregression for arbitrary constants ak and
  v p  av   zz t k t k t t kp1
independently and identically distributed. Then the optimal reference
point for period t is given by
  
ˆ ¯¯ y p a y   y   a y .    t k t k t k t k
kp1 kp1
Proof. See Appendix B.
The carrier of happiness is now a generalized double difference:
  
ˆ ¯¯ y   y p y   a y   y   a y .    ( ) ( ) t t t k t k t k t k
kp1 kp1
The term corresponds to a conventional habit, whereas the
    a y kt  k kp1
term again represents a habituation to peers. Regardless of
  ¯   a y kt  k kp1
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correlations), the same coefﬁcients ak enter both forms of habituation.
The reason is that is affected by the aggregate shock , which is y G t kt  k
redundant when assessing Jt. Subtracting from ﬁlters out this ¯ yy t kt  k
shock. The implication is that lagged output and lagged peer output
have the opposite effect over happiness. Consider, for example, an in-
dividual with a stable level of wealth who compares himself with a neigh-
bor who is currently wealthier. The above formulation allows him to be
happier when, for as long as he remembers, this neighbor has always
been wealthy, as opposed to the case in which their relative fortunes
have been recently reversed.
The carrier of happiness can also be expressed in terms of changes
in social position:
 
ˆ y   y p w   a w .   t t t k t k
kp1
In this case, the individual compares his current social position against wt
a weighted sum of the positions he occupied in the past. A key property
of this formulation is that a strong process of peer comparisons (where
only relative position matters) can coexist with a strong process of habit
formation (through coefﬁcients ak with a sum that is close, or
    ak kp1
even equal, to one).
In an extension to the present paper (Rayo and Becker 2007), we
argue that this simultaneous presence of strong habits and strong peer
comparisons can help account for several results obtained in the hap-
piness surveys. Moreover, we argue that this feature has been absent
from standard utility formulations, where habits and peer comparisons
are effectively treated as substitutes for each other.
X. Concluding Remarks
We have modeled happiness as a biological measurement instrument
that guides the agent’s decisions. Analogous to an eye that specializes
in measuring differences between neighboring objects, a happiness
function that evaluates economic success in relative terms serves as a
more accurate decision guide. In our model, in particular, the agent’s
success is evaluated against a reference point that constantly changes
over time in tandem with his opportunities. This reference point inte-
grates information that can best predict the agent’s performance, in-
cluding information contained in his past levels of output as well as the
output of his peers. As a result, the agent is concerned not with his
absolute level of success, but rather with his success relative to a bench-
mark that reﬂects his own history and social environment.
Throughout, we have suggested a statistical parallel between happi-328 journal of political economy
ness and an optimal incentive scheme that seeks to promote effort. This
parallel allows us to rationalize multiple aspects of happiness using well-
known concepts from incentive theory. Indeed, when viewed from an
economic perspective, happiness appears to have multiple signs of sta-
tistical inference. For example, in addition to accounting for habits and
peer comparisons, this incentive approach rationalizes why luck has an
impact over happiness and why this impact is short-lived.
Our discussion of habits and peer comparisons is far from exhaustive.
Possible extensions could address the issue of habituation patterns that
differ according to the type of good involved, as well as the fact that
some goods are more prone to social comparisons than others. In both
cases, statistical principles may prove to play a role.
Appendix A
An Illustration of S-Shaped Functions
In the text, we considered the case in which output was determined exclusively
by the agent’s efﬁciency choice J and a state variableQ.Moreover,Qwasobserved
by the agent before choosing J and could also be encoded in the agent’s hap-
piness function. This fact allowed the principal to perfectly target incentives via
extreme step functions. Here, we extend the model by allowing the agent to
observe an additional detailed signal q, which provides further information
regarding his output potential but which can no longer be encoded in V. In
this case, the principal no longer foresees the full set of contingencies that can
directly inﬂuence output. Anticipating this information disadvantage, the prin-
cipal will design smoother happiness functions that spread incentives more
evenly over the output domain.
For analytical convenience, for this exercise we assume thatbothstatevariables
Q and q, as well as output y, are discrete, taking only integer values. At the
beginning of the period, the two states are realized and observed by the agent.
Conditional on Q, the ﬁner state q can take different values ranging 2N 1
from to , for arbitrary . The realization of q is determined by Q N Q NN   0
a probability distribution function with mean . We assume that P(qFQ) q p Q
is increasing in q to the left of its mean and decreasing to the right. P(qFQ)
Next, the agent selects , and output y is realized. We assume that, J   [0, 1]
conditional on q, output is independent of Q. Namely, Q inﬂuences output only
indirectly via its effect on the distribution of q. Speciﬁcally, we assume that,
given q and J, output takes one of two values:
q with probability J y p (A1) {q 1 with probability 1 J.
In this case, the agent’s efﬁciency choice J simply transfers probability weight
from a low to a high realization of output. This binary structure is by no means
critical for the results, but makes the analysis more transparent. Finally, after
output is realized, the agent experiences a happiness level , which can V(y, Q)
depend on the ﬁrst state Q, but not on q. Throughout, given free disposal of
output, we assume without loss that is nondecreasing in y. V(y, Q)evolutionary efﬁciency and happiness 329
A. Symmetric Information
As a preliminary step, consider the case in which the states Q and q are always
identical to each other (formally, and ), which means that N p 0 P(q p QFQ) p 1
information is symmetric between principal and agent. From (A1), conditional
on Q, only two values of the agent’s happiness function are relevant for his
decision, namely, and , depending on whether output is high V(Q, Q) V(Q 1, Q)
( ) or low ( ). Let DV denote the difference between these two y p Q y p Q 1
happiness values, which we assume is strictly positive (otherwise, the agent would
be indifferent among all his decisions).
Conditional on J and Q, the agent’s expected happiness is given by
E[VFJ, Q] p J7V(Q, Q) (1  J)7V(Q 1, Q)
p J7DV V(Q 1, Q). (A2)
Since this expression is increasing in J, and therefore is maximized when
, the agent’s satisﬁcing set is again an interval , where the J p 1[ J (V, e), 1] min
lower bound solves . From (A2), this lower J (V, e) E[VFJ , Q] p E[VF1, Q] e min min
bound takes a simple form
14
e
J (V, e) p 1  , min DV
where a larger slope DV is equivalent to a smaller perception error e.
From this expression it follows that the principal’s problem of maximizing
Jmin reduces to maximizing the slope DV (subject to the happiness bounds Vmax
and Vmin). This maximization is achieved by setting
V for all y   Q max V(y, Q) p {V for all y   Q 1, min
which is a simple version of the step functions derived in the text.
15
B. Private Information
Consider now the case in which, for each value of Q, the state q can take multiple
values that are observed only by the agent (i.e., ). We begin with the simple N   1
case in which q can take one of three values (i.e., ), given by , Q, N p 1 Q 1
and . Suppose that the associated distribution is symmetric around Q 1 P(qFQ)
. In addition, let denote the probability of the intermediate q p Q p { P(QFQ)
state, and normalize the happiness range to [0, 1]. [V , V ] min max
We proceed by ﬁxing Q and solving for the optimal function given this state.
From the principal’s point of view, given Q, output y can take four values,ranging
from to . Denote these values, in increasing order, by . Q 2 Q 1 y , …, y 14
14 This expression implicitly assumes that e does not exceed DV. Otherwise, the lower
bound Jmin would become zero. However, provided that e is small, this will not occur
under the optimal happiness function.
15 Another case in which step functions are optimal occurs when q can take multiple
values for each value of Q (i.e., ), but neither principal nor agent observes q up- N   1
front. In this case, as in the text, information remains symmetric and, conditional on Q,
the distributions of y remain single-crossing in J (since the probability distributions
are assumed to be single-peaked at their mean). Therefore, a reasoning similar P(qFQ)
to that in the text applies.330 journal of political economy
Fig. A1.—Private information
Accordingly, the happiness function can also take four values, denoted V , 1
. From the agent’s point of view, on the other hand, once q is learned, …, V4
output can take only two values—from (A1). For example, in the intermediate
state , output can take only one of the intermediate values and , as q p Q yy 23
shown in ﬁgure A1.
Associated with each state q, the agent faces a different satisﬁcing set. Denote
the lower bounds of these sets by (where the dependence on V and e J (q) min
has been dropped for simplicity). Consider again the intermediate state q p
. Under this state, the agent’s expected payoff equals . Accord- QJ V  (1  J) V 32
ingly, the lower bound of his satisﬁcing set (which solves J (Q) V  [1   min 3
) becomes J (Q)]V p V  e min 2 3
e
J (Q) p 1  . min V  V 32
Similarly, the lower bounds for the satisﬁcing sets in the extreme states Q 1
and become and Q 1 J (Q 1) p 1 e/(V  V ) J (Q 1) p 1 e/(V   min 2 1 min 4
. V ) 3
The principal now faces a trade-off: she cannot maximize the lower bound
for any given state without simultaneously reducing the lower bound for an
adjacent state. For example, the lower bound for the intermediate state q p
would be maximized by setting and , but this would eliminate Q V p 0 V p 1 23
all incentives in the two extreme states. Similarly, incentives can be improved
in the extreme states by increasing and reducing , but this would reduce VV 23
incentives in the intermediate state.
In order to derive an exact solution for this problem,we must assumeaspeciﬁc
form for the randomizations followed by the agent within his satisﬁcing sets.evolutionary efﬁciency and happiness 331
Here, for simplicity, we assume that these randomizations are uniform (but very
similar results are obtained under more general distributions). In this case, the
principal’s objective can be expressed as a weighted average of the lower bounds
:
16 J (q) min
Q 1
P(qFQ)7J (q) p   min
qpQ 1
1 p7J (Q)  (1  p)7[J (Q 1)  J (Q 1)]. (A3) min min min 2
Substituting for the values of and eliminating redundant terms, we can J (q) min
express this objective equivalently as
1 1 1 1
  p7   (1  p)7   . () [] V  V 2 V  VV  V 3 2 2 1 4 3
Accordingly, the principal seeks to minimize the expression in brackets by
selecting four values within the happiness range [0, 1]. This problem V , …, V 14
is solved by setting
(V , V , V , V ) p (0, m,1  m, 1), 1 2 3 4
where
 1
1/2 p
m { 2  2 () [] 1 p
is a decreasing function of p.
For example, as illustrated in ﬁgure A1, when , we obtain , and V
11 p p m p 33
becomes a straight line. On the other hand, when , we obtain , and
11 p 1 m ! 33
the optimal V becomes S-shaped: the slope between the intermediate values
and is larger than the slope between the extreme values and and y y y y 23 12
between and . The reason is that a p larger than induces the principal to
1 yy 34 3
place more weight on the intermediate state relative to the extreme ones. In
the limit when , m converges to zero, and the optimal V converges to a step p r 1
function with and , that is, the type of function that V p V p 0 V p V p 1 1 2 3 4
was optimal under symmetric information between principal and agent.
C. A Greater Number of States
Consider now the case in which q can take values for each value of Q 2N 1
(ranging from to ) for arbitrary . As above, we ﬁx Q and solve Q N Q NN   1
for the optimal function given this state. For any given q, output can again take
one of two values: q and . Let and denote the happiness levels q 1 VV qq  1
16 To see this, notice that the expected value of output given Q (the principal’s pay-
off) is , where represents the expected draw of J from   P(qFQ) 7 {q   1   E[JFq]} E[JFq] q
the satisﬁcing set . Moreover, under uniform randomizations, this expected [J (q), 1] min
draw equals . The objective in (A3) follows from substituting for this (1/2)[1  J (q)] min
value and eliminating redundant terms.332 journal of political economy
associated with these values, and let . Accordingly, for any given DV { V  V q q q 1
q, the agent faces a satisﬁcing set with a lower bound given by
17 J (q) min
ee
J (q) p 1  p 1  . (A4) min V  V DV qq  1 q
Under the assumption ofuniformrandomizationswithintheagent’ssatisﬁcing
sets, from the same reasoning as above, the principal’s problem simpliﬁes to
maximizing the weighted average of these lower bounds . Her choice J (q) min
variables are now happiness levels ranging from to , where 2N 2 VV (Q N) 1 Q N
is the lowest possible level of output given Qand isthehighest. (Q N) 1 Q N
Accordingly, her problem becomes
Q N
max P(qFQ)7J (q)   min
qpQ N V ,…,V (Q N) 1 Q N
subject to V , …, V   [V , V ]. (Q N) 1 Q N min max
When we substitute for the values of in the principal’s objective using J (q) min
(A4) and eliminate redundant terms, this problem further simpliﬁes to
Q N 1
min P(qFQ)7 (A5)  
DV qpQ N V ,…,V q (Q N) 1 Q N
subject to V , …, V   [V , V ]. (Q N) 1 Q N min max
The following proposition provides the solution to this problem as a function
of the prior distribution . A numerical example is provided below. P(qFQ)
Proposition 4. Problem (A5) is uniquely solved by setting
V p V , Q N max
V p V , (Q N) 1 min
and, for all q,
1/2 DV p P(qFQ) 7C, q
where C is a constant equal to
 1
Q N
1/2 (V  V )7 P(qFQ).   max min []
qpQ N
Proof. See Appendix B.
From this proposition, we learn that the optimal happiness function uses the
full range , and, for any given q, it has a slope proportional to [V , V ] DV min max q
the square root of the probability of that state, . In this way, the optimal
1/2 P(qFQ)
function concentrates a higher slope over output ranges that are more likely
given Q.
Figure A2 presents an example with and . Figure N p 10 [V , V ] p [0, 1] min max
A2a graphs two distribution functions that are discrete versions ofnormal P(qFQ)
densities. Both densities are centered around an arbitrary Q, with standard de-
17 As before, this expression implicitly assumes that e does not exceed . Provided DVq
that e is small, this will indeed be the case under the optimal happiness function.evolutionary efﬁciency and happiness 333
Fig. A2.—S-shaped curves
viations of 1.8 and 2.8. Figure A2b, on the other hand, presentsthe twoassociated
optimal happiness functions derived from proposition 4. As before, a more
disperse density leads to a function with a slope that is more evenly spread.
D. Adaptation over Time
Notice that all happiness functions derived in this appendix are fully indepen-
dent of the absolute value of output y. Indeed, they can all be expressed as a
function of the difference between y and the intermediate state Q. Accordingly,
the carrier of happiness becomes . As in the text, the particular benchmark y Q
corresponds to the ex ante expected value of output conditional on ˆ y p Q
. Consequently, as Q changes over time, these S-shaped functions also shift J p 1
in tandem with the agent’s output potential.334 journal of political economy
Appendix B
Proofs
Proof of Proposition 2
For any given , let denote the optimized value of problem (P1). e 1 0 J*(e) ! 1
In addition, let denote the threshold for the correspondingoptimalfunction ˆ y(e)
, characterized in proposition 1. In particular, is uniquely determined ˆ V*(e) y(e)
by the equality
ˆˆ f(y(e) F1) p f(y(e) FJ*(e)).
Since the densities and are single-peaked at their respective f(yF1) f(yFJ*(e))
means and , the above equality means that the threshold ˆ E[yF1] E[yFJ*(e)] y(e)
must lie between these two means:
ˆ E[yFJ*(e)] ! y(e) ! E[yF1]. (B1)
We now claim that, as , . To see this, consider any feasible hap- e r 0 J*(e) r 1
piness function that is nondecreasing and nonconstant. Since the densities V0
are stochastically increasing in J, the expected happiness is in- f(yFJ) E[V FJ] 0
creasing in J. It follows that , the lower limit of the agent’s satisﬁcing J (V , e) min 0
set under , must converge to one as . But, by deﬁnition, V e r 0 J*(e)   0
, which implies that must also converge to one. J (V , e) J*(e) min 0
This claim implies that, as , . Therefore, from (B1), the e r 0 E[yFJ*(e)] r E[yF1]
threshold must converge to . The proposition follows as a result. QED ˆ y(e) E[yF1]
Proof of Proposition 3
Using the above technology, we can write
     
y   a y p J   aJ  G  aG  z .       t k t k t k t k t k t kt
kp1 kp1 kp1
Thus, in equilibrium,
     
¯¯ y   a y p 1  a   G  aG .       () t k t k k t k t k
kp1 kp1 kp1
Combining these two expressions we obtain
  
w p a w  (J  1)   a (J  1)  z ,    t k t k t k t kt
kp1 kp1
which satisﬁes (10) once for all k. The result follows from setting J p 1 t k
(so that ) and rearranging terms. QED
  ˆ J p J p 1 w p  a w tt  k t k t k kp1evolutionary efﬁciency and happiness 335
Proof of Proposition 4
Consider a relaxed version of problem (A5):
Q N 1
min P(qFQ)7  
DV qpQ N V ,…,V q (Q N) 1 Q N
Q N
subject to DV   V  V ,   q max min
qpQ N
where the new constraint is implied by (but does not imply) the original con-
straint. In this relaxed problem, the effective choice variables are the slopes
(for ). Expressed in terms of these new choice variables DV q p Q N, …, Q N q
, the relaxed problem is strictly convex and can therefore be solved using a DVq
simple Lagrangian. In particular, if we let l denote the multiplier for the con-
straint, the ﬁrst-order condition for each value of is DVq
P(qFQ)
   l p 0. 2 (DV ) q
When combined with the fact that the constraint must bind (i.e.,
), these ﬁrst-order conditions deliver a unique solution:
Q N   DV p V  V q max min qpQ N
1/2  1/2 DV p P(qFQ) 7l q
 1
Q N
1/2 1/2 p P(qFQ) 7(V  V )7 P(qFQ),   max min []
qpQ N
where the second equality follows from solving for by adding across all
 1/2 l
values of and using the binding constraint. Notice that these values for DVq
are the ones stated in the proposition. DVq
Consider now the original problem (A5). When we set and V p V Q N max
and use the same slopes derived in the relaxed problem, the V p V DV (Q N) 1 min q
original constraint is satisﬁed, and therefore a solution to (A5) is achieved.
Moreover, uniqueness of this solution follows from the fact that the solution of
the relaxed problem is unique and, given these unique values for , the only DVq
way to satisfy the original constraint is by setting and V p VV p Q N max (Q N) 1
. QED Vmin
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